Kremlin warns of ‘dangerous’ moment as U.S.-Russia nuclear treaty set to expire

The impending expiration of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on February 5, 2026, marks a critical juncture in global nuclear arms control, potentially ushering in an era of unchecked strategic competition between the world's two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia. This treaty, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, was the last remaining arms control agreement limiting the deployed strategic nuclear warheads and launchers of both nations. It capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 for each side, and deployed and non-deployed launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers) at 800, with an operational limit of 700 deployed launchers. Its predecessor, START I, expired in 2009, and after a brief interim, New START came into force. The treaty was initially for ten years, with an option to extend it for another five years, which was exercised in February 2021 by the Biden administration shortly after taking office. The current crisis stems from a breakdown in dialogue and trust, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions, particularly Russia's war in Ukraine. In February 2023, Russia announced its suspension of participation in the treaty, citing U.S. efforts to undermine Russia's strategic security and obstacles to inspections. While Russia stated it would continue to observe the limits, the suspension crippled the vital verification and transparency mechanisms, such as on-site inspections and data exchanges, which are crucial for building confidence and preventing miscalculation. Without a successor treaty or an extension, the world faces a scenario where, for the first time since 1972 (with the SALT I agreements), there will be no legally binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. Key stakeholders in this unfolding drama include, primarily, the United States and Russia. The U.S. seeks strategic stability and a predictable nuclear environment, but also faces the challenge of Russia's actions and the growing nuclear arsenal of China. Russia views arms control through the prism of its security concerns, perceiving NATO expansion and U.S. missile defense systems as threats to its strategic parity. China, a rising nuclear power, is a significant third party, though not a signatory to New START. Both the U.S. and Russia have expressed a desire to bring China into future arms control frameworks, a proposition China has consistently rejected, arguing its arsenal is significantly smaller. Other nuclear powers like the UK, France, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, along with the broader international community, are deeply concerned about the implications for global stability and non-proliferation efforts. For India, the expiration of New START carries significant implications. India, a responsible nuclear power with a 'No First Use' (NFU) policy and a commitment to 'Credible Minimum Deterrence,' thrives in a stable international security environment. An unconstrained nuclear arms race between the U.S. and Russia could lead to heightened global strategic instability, increasing the risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation. This instability could have ripple effects, potentially impacting India's regional security dynamics, especially concerning its nuclear-armed neighbors, Pakistan and China. The erosion of bilateral arms control treaties also weakens the broader international non-proliferation regime, which India, despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state, supports in principle by advocating for universal, non-discriminatory, and verifiable disarmament. Historically, the Cold War era saw the development of numerous arms control treaties, from SALT I and II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties) to START I and II, and the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, all aimed at managing the nuclear rivalry and preventing a catastrophic war. The collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019, following U.S. withdrawal citing Russian violations, was a precursor to the current predicament. The current situation suggests a regression to a pre-arms control era, reminiscent of the early Cold War, where competition trumped cooperation. This historical context underscores the fragility of strategic stability and the constant need for dialogue and verifiable agreements. Looking ahead, the future implications are concerning. Without New START, there will be no limits on the number of strategic warheads or launchers, nor any transparency measures to monitor each other's arsenals. This could lead to a quantitative and qualitative arms race, with both sides potentially developing and deploying new types of strategic weapons. The absence of verification mechanisms increases the risk of misperception and miscalculation, making crisis management more difficult. Furthermore, it sets a negative precedent for future arms control efforts, especially regarding emerging technologies like hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence in warfare. For India, this means navigating an increasingly complex and unpredictable strategic landscape, requiring robust diplomatic engagement and a vigilant assessment of its own security posture. While no direct constitutional article governs international nuclear treaties, India's commitment to international peace and security, as enshrined in **Article 51** of the Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy), underscores its interest in global strategic stability and disarmament efforts. India's consistent advocacy for a nuclear-weapon-free world and its participation in multilateral forums like the Conference on Disarmament are reflections of this broader policy objective.