‘Structural differences have not disappeared’: Chinese strategic affairs scholar on India-China ties

The recent commentary by Hu Shisheng, a leading Chinese strategic affairs scholar specializing in South Asia, provides a critical window into Beijing's strategic calculus regarding India-China relations. His assertion that 'structural differences have not disappeared' and that the immediate focus should be on 'institutionalising stability' rather than a 'dramatic settlement' encapsulates the current state of bilateral ties — characterized by a fragile military disengagement overshadowed by deep-seated strategic mistrust. The background to this assessment lies in the violent Galwan Valley clashes of June 15, 2020, where 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese personnel were killed — the first fatal confrontation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 1975. This incident shattered the framework of confidence-building measures (CBMs) established through agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, and 2013, which mandated mutual troop reductions, prior notification of exercises, and prohibition of firearms within 2 km of the LAC. The 2020 standoff saw massive troop deployments by both sides — over 50,000 troops each — along with heavy artillery, tanks, and air defence systems in Eastern Ladakh, fundamentally altering the military equilibrium. Since then, 21 rounds of Corps Commander-level talks have led to disengagement at key friction points: Galwan Valley (June 2020), Pangong Tso (February 2021), Gogra-Hot Springs (PP-15, September 2022), and most recently, the Depsang Plains and Demchok (October 2024). However, as Hu Shisheng notes, these are tactical adjustments, not strategic resolutions. The core structural differences remain: India insists on restoration of status quo ante as of April 2020 and adherence to all bilateral agreements, while China seeks to normalize the new military posture and delink the boundary issue from broader bilateral engagement — a stance India has consistently rejected, as reiterated by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar: 'The state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.' Key stakeholders include the political leadership on both sides — Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping — whose interactions at multilateral forums (SCO, BRICS, G20) have been carefully choreographed but substantively limited. The military establishments, particularly India's Northern Command and China's Western Theater Command, manage day-to-day border dynamics. The diplomatic corps, led by India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi (also a Politburo member), steer the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism — established in 2003 — which remains the highest-level forum for boundary negotiations, though it has not met since December 2019. For India, the significance is multi-dimensional. Economically, bilateral trade crossed $135 billion in 2023-24, but with a staggering trade deficit exceeding $85 billion — heavily skewed in China's favour. Politically, the border crisis has accelerated India's strategic alignment with the Quad (US, Japan, Australia), deepened defence cooperation with the US (including foundational agreements like COMCASA, BECA, LEMOA), and spurred infrastructure development along the LAC — over 6,000 km of roads built since 2014 under the Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Socially, the Galwan clashes ignited a wave of economic nationalism — bans on 300+ Chinese apps (including TikTok, PUBG), restrictions on Chinese investment via Press Note 3 (2020), and scrutiny of Chinese telecom vendors in 5G trials. Constitutionally, Article 51(c) of the Directive Principles of State Policy mandates that the State 'endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations' — a principle guiding India's insistence on adherence to bilateral agreements. Article 253 empowers Parliament to make laws for implementing international treaties, underpinning the legal basis for border management protocols. The Defence of India Act, 1971, and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958, provide operational legal frameworks for border security. Broader themes include the tension between strategic autonomy and alliance-building in India's foreign policy, the challenge of managing a rising neighbour with unresolved territorial disputes, and the limits of economic interdependence as a conflict-dampening mechanism. The 'institutionalising stability' approach Hu advocates aligns with proposals for a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) upgrade, joint patrolling mechanisms, and a hotline between theatre commanders — but without political trust, such mechanisms risk becoming mere crisis-management tools. Future implications are sobering. The 2024 disengagement at Depsang and Demchok, while positive, covers only a fraction of the 3,488 km LAC. China's new Land Border Law (effective January 2022), which mandates 'safeguarding territorial integrity' and encourages border village construction (xiaokang villages), signals long-term territorial consolidation. India's response — Vibrant Villages Programme (2022), enhanced surveillance via UAVs and ISR satellites, and the proposed Integrated Theatre Commands — reflects a shift from reactive to proactive deterrence. For aspirants, the key takeaway: India-China relations have entered a 'cold peace' phase — managed confrontation without conflict, where institutionalising stability is the ceiling, not the floor, of bilateral engagement.