Delhi Police authorised pellet gun use against protestors on July 20: RAF general diary entry

The authorisation of pellet gun use by Delhi Police against protestors at Jantar Mantar on July 20, 2024, as revealed through a Rapid Action Force (RAF) general diary entry registered at Parliament Street police station on July 22, represents a significant escalation in crowd control measures that demands careful constitutional and institutional scrutiny. This incident did not occur in isolation but emerges from a broader context of increasing tensions between state authorities and civilian demonstrators in India's capital, where Jantar Mantar has historically served as the designated protest site since the 1990s following Supreme Court directions in the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan case. The key stakeholders involved include the Delhi Police operating under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the RAF as a specialised anti-riot unit of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), protestors exercising their fundamental rights, and the media — particularly The Hindu — whose reporting triggered the diary entry. The sequence of events is telling: pellet guns were authorised and used on July 20, injuries were reported, The Hindu published its report, and only then did the RAF register the general diary entry on July 22, followed by withdrawal of pump action guns, electric shields, anti-riot guns, and shock batons. This reactive pattern raises serious questions about ex-ante authorisation protocols and accountability mechanisms. Constitutionally, this incident engages multiple fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, Article 19(1)(b) ensures the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. The use of pellet guns — classified as "less-lethal" but documented to cause severe ocular injuries, permanent disability, and even fatalities — must be tested against the proportionality doctrine established in Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly the Puttaswamy judgment (2017) on privacy and the standard of "necessity and proportionality" for state action restricting fundamental rights. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), though not legally binding, provide international benchmarks that Indian courts have referenced. The significance for India extends beyond this single incident. It touches on the growing militarisation of policing, the erosion of protest spaces, and the accountability gap in paramilitary operations. The RAF, created in 1992 specifically for riot control, operates under the CRPF Act, 1949, but its deployment for routine protest management blurs the line between law enforcement and internal security operations. The withdrawal of equipment post-incident suggests institutional recognition of overreach, yet the absence of a transparent inquiry, disciplinary action, or policy revision indicates systemic gaps. Broader themes include the tension between public order (State List, Entry 1) and fundamental rights, the role of media as a watchdog in democratic accountability, and the need for a national use-of-force policy aligned with the Model Police Act, 2006 recommendations. The Police Act, 1861 — still governing much of police functioning — lacks specific provisions on less-lethal weapons, leaving discretion dangerously wide. Future implications are profound. Without legislative action — such as amending the CRPF Act or enacting a central law on crowd control weapons — similar incidents will recur. Courts may be compelled to issue stricter guidelines, as seen in the 2016 Jammu & Kashmir pellet gun case where the Supreme Court mandated inquiry commissions. Civil society pressure for a "Right to Protest" legislation may grow. For aspirants, this case study encapsulates the intersection of constitutional law, internal security, police reform, and democratic governance — core themes for UPSC GS-II, GS-III, and Essay papers.