US criticises China’s move at Scarborough Reef

The recent US criticism of China's establishment of a 'national nature reserve' at Scarborough Reef marks another escalation in the long-standing South China Sea disputes, a region that has become the epicenter of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. To understand the gravity of this development, we must first appreciate the geography and history. Scarborough Reef, known as Panatag Shoal to Filipinos and Huangyan Island to the Chinese, is a triangular-shaped chain of reefs and rocks located approximately 220 kilometers west of Luzon, Philippines, and about 650 kilometers from the nearest Chinese coast at Hainan. The reef has been a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishermen for generations, lying well within the Philippines' 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both China and the Philippines are signatories. The flashpoint traces back to 2012, when a standoff between Chinese and Philippine vessels at the reef ended with China establishing de facto control, blocking Filipino fishermen from accessing the lagoon. This prompted the Philippines, under President Benigno Aquino III, to initiate arbitration proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in 2013, challenging China's sweeping 'nine-dash line' claims. In a landmark ruling on July 12, 2016, the PCA tribunal unanimously ruled that China's nine-dash line had no legal basis under UNCLOS, that Scarborough Reef is a rock under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS (entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, not an EEZ), and that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its EEZ by interfering with fishing and petroleum exploration. China, which had boycotted the proceedings, rejected the ruling as 'null and void.' Fast forward to 2024: China's announcement of a 'national nature reserve' at Scarborough Reef is widely seen by international legal experts and the US as a thinly veiled attempt to legitimize its illegal occupation and restrict access under the guise of environmental protection. The US State Department's press release explicitly linked this move to the 2016 Arbitral Award, stating it 'could restrict Filipino fishermen's access to their traditional fishing grounds, as reflected in the 2016 Arbitral Award.' This language is deliberate — it reinforces the legal finality of the PCA ruling, which under Article 296 of UNCLOS and Article 39 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, is binding on the parties. The US, while not a party to UNCLOS (the Senate has not ratified it despite support from successive administrations), champions 'freedom of navigation' operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea as part of its broader commitment to a rules-based international order. For India, this development carries profound strategic, economic, and legal significance. Strategically, India has consistently advocated for a 'free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific,' a vision articulated by Prime Minister Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. India's Act East Policy and its deepening defence ties with Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and other ASEAN claimant states are directly linked to maritime security in these waters. In 2023, India and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding on coast guard cooperation, and BrahMos missile exports to the Philippines underscore defence collaboration. Economically, over 55% of India's trade by volume passes through the South China Sea; any disruption to freedom of navigation threatens India's energy security and supply chains. Legally, India's own maritime disputes — particularly with Pakistan over Sir Creek and the maritime boundary in the Arabian Sea — make it a stakeholder in the uniform application of UNCLOS. India's 2015 joint statement with the US during President Obama's Republic Day visit explicitly referenced 'the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.' Constitutionally, Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution directs the State to 'foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.' This provision, read with Article 253 (legislation for giving effect to international agreements), underscores India's obligation to uphold UNCLOS, which it ratified in 1995. The Maritime Zones Act, 1976, and the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, domesticate UNCLOS principles in Indian law. The Scarborough Reef episode reinforces why India must continue to advocate for dispute resolution through peaceful means and legal frameworks, not unilateral coercion. Looking ahead, the implications are sobering. China's 'nature reserve' tactic may be replicated at other features like Second Thomas Shoal (where the BRP Sierra Madre grounding persists) or Subi Reef. The US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) expansion in 2023, granting US access to nine Philippine bases — including those facing the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait — signals a hardening deterrence posture. For India, the lesson is clear: maritime domain awareness, naval modernization (Project 75/75I submarines, P-8I aircraft), and multilateral engagement through Quad, ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are non-negotiable. As the 2016 Arbitral Award approaches its tenth anniversary in 2026, the international community's resolve to enforce it will be tested — and India's voice, as a major maritime power and champion of the Global South, will be pivotal in shaping whether the South China Sea remains a 'lake' for one power or a shared commons governed by law.