Iran, Oman working on plan to reopen Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, stands as one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Approximately 20-21% of global petroleum liquids consumption — roughly 18-20 million barrels per day — transits this 39-kilometer-wide passage at its narrowest point, making it the single most important oil transit route globally. The recent reports of Iran and Oman collaborating on a plan to "reopen" or secure the strait signal a potentially significant shift in regional geopolitics, especially given the Trump administration's explicit opposition (2017-2021) to any arrangement granting Iran control over this strategic waterway. Historically, the strait's security has been a flashpoint since the 1980s Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq conflict, when both sides attacked commercial shipping. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 — to which India is a party (ratified 1995) — designates the strait as an international strait used for international navigation, guaranteeing "transit passage" rights under Article 38. This means all ships, including warships, enjoy the right of continuous and expeditious transit. Iran, however, has not ratified UNCLOS and has periodically threatened to close the strait in response to sanctions or military pressure, most notably in 2011-2012 and again during 2018-2019 tensions following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) under President Trump. Key stakeholders include Iran, which seeks to leverage its geographic position for political and economic leverage; Oman, a traditional mediator in Gulf disputes that maintains cordial ties with both Iran and Western powers; the United States, which maintains the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain to ensure freedom of navigation; and major energy importers like China, India, Japan, and South Korea. For India, the stakes are enormous: in 2023-24, India imported approximately 85% of its crude oil needs, with over 60% sourced from the Persian Gulf region, much of it transiting Hormuz. Any disruption directly impacts India's energy security, current account deficit, inflation (via fuel prices), and strategic autonomy. Article 297 of the Indian Constitution vests the Union with control over territorial waters and maritime zones, while the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, and the Territorial Waters Act, 1976, provide the legal framework for India's maritime claims and security. The reported Iran-Oman plan — if it materializes into a formal security arrangement — could reduce reliance on external security guarantors like the U.S., aligning with Oman's long-standing "balance of power" diplomacy. However, it raises questions about Iran's compliance with UNCLOS transit passage norms, especially if Tehran seeks operational control. For India, this underscores the need to deepen engagement with both nations: India-Oman strategic ties (including access to Duqm port) and India-Iran connectivity projects (Chabahar port, INSTC) are vital hedges. The development also connects to broader themes: freedom of navigation under international law, energy diplomacy, Indo-Pacific security architecture, and the role of middle powers in shaping regional order. Future implications include potential renegotiation of security frameworks in the Gulf, impact on global oil pricing benchmarks, and India's own naval posture — the Indian Navy's "Mission Based Deployments" in the Gulf since 2019 reflect New Delhi's proactive stance. Aspirants should track how this evolves in the context of U.S. policy shifts, Iran's nuclear program, and the evolving India-GCC strategic partnership.