SC Collegium recommends elevation of five judges as Chief Justices of High Courts

The news of the Supreme Court Collegium recommending Justice Manoj Gupta for appointment as the Chief Justice of the Uttarakhand High Court, addressing a vacancy set for January 9, 2026, offers a crucial window into India's complex judicial appointment system. This seemingly routine administrative decision is, in fact, a cornerstone of maintaining judicial independence and ensuring the smooth functioning of the country's higher judiciary.

At the heart of this process lies the Collegium system, a unique mechanism that has evolved through judicial pronouncements rather than parliamentary legislation. Initially, the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts was primarily an executive function, with the President of India (acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers) making appointments in 'consultation' with the Chief Justice of India (CJI). This understanding was reinforced by the **First Judges Case (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1982)**, which held that 'consultation' did not mean 'concurrence,' effectively giving primacy to the executive.

However, this paradigm shifted dramatically with the **Second Judges Case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 1993)**. This landmark judgment overturned the S.P. Gupta ruling, establishing that the opinion of the CJI, formed in consultation with two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, would have primacy. This gave birth to the 'Collegium' system. The **Third Judges Case (In re Special Reference 1 of 1998)** further clarified the composition and functioning of the Collegium, stipulating that for Supreme Court appointments, it would comprise the CJI and four senior-most Supreme Court judges, while for High Court appointments, it would consist of the CJI and two senior-most Supreme Court judges.

Thus, when the Supreme Court Collegium recommends Justice Manoj Gupta, it is this constitutionally evolved body that is exercising its mandate. The key stakeholders involved are primarily the **Supreme Court Collegium** itself, which initiates and finalizes recommendations. The **President of India** is the formal appointing authority, acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, which processes the Collegium's recommendations through the **Ministry of Law and Justice**. For High Court appointments, the **Governor of the concerned state** (Uttarakhand in this case) and the **Chief Justice of the High Court** (if the appointment is of a regular judge, not the CJ) are also consulted, as per **Article 217(1) of the Constitution**, which governs the appointment of High Court judges. This article states that a High Court judge is appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court. Similarly, **Article 124(2)** deals with the appointment of Supreme Court judges.

This system matters profoundly for India because it directly impacts the **independence of the judiciary**, which is considered a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Proponents argue that the Collegium shields judicial appointments from political interference, thereby safeguarding the judiciary's ability to act as a neutral arbiter and a check on executive and legislative overreach. A truly independent judiciary is vital for upholding fundamental rights, ensuring the rule of law, and maintaining the delicate balance of powers in a democracy. The efficiency of this system in filling vacancies, like the one arising in Uttarakhand, is crucial for addressing the massive pendency of cases that plagues Indian courts, affecting justice delivery and economic activity.

However, the Collegium system has also faced significant criticism for its perceived lack of transparency, accountability, and objectivity. Critics often point to allegations of nepotism and the absence of clear criteria for selection. This led to a significant attempt at reform in 2014 with the **99th Constitutional Amendment Act**, which established the **National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)**. The NJAC aimed to replace the Collegium with a body comprising judicial luminaries, law ministers, and eminent persons, to bring in more transparency and executive involvement. However, the Supreme Court, in 2015, struck down the NJAC Act, declaring it unconstitutional as it threatened judicial independence, thereby reinstating the Collegium system.

Looking ahead, the debate surrounding judicial appointments is far from over. Efforts to finalize a revised **Memorandum of Procedure (MoP)**, aimed at streamlining the Collegium's functioning and introducing greater transparency, have been ongoing but have not fully resolved the underlying tensions between the judiciary and the executive. The timely filling of judicial vacancies, ensuring diversity in appointments, and striking a balance between judicial independence and accountability will remain critical challenges. The appointment of Chief Justices, who lead High Courts, has significant implications for the administration of justice in their respective states, influencing judicial reforms, case management, and legal interpretations. Therefore, each recommendation by the Collegium is not just an administrative formality but a key event shaping the future trajectory of India's judicial landscape and, by extension, its democratic governance.