Retired HC judges ‘embarrassed’ to sit as junior ad hoc judges to clear pendency: CJI

India's judicial system, a cornerstone of its democratic framework, has long grappled with the colossal challenge of case pendency. The recent observation by the Chief Justice of India (CJI), D.Y. Chandrachud, that retired High Court judges feel 'embarrassed' to sit as junior ad hoc judges highlights a critical facet of this problem and the complexities involved in finding viable solutions. This issue is not merely administrative; it delves into judicial hierarchy, the optimal utilization of judicial talent, and the broader implications for justice delivery in the country.

**Background Context and What Happened:**

The backdrop to this discussion is the alarming backlog of cases across Indian courts, particularly in the High Courts. As of early 2024, High Courts collectively face a pendency of over 60 lakh cases, a figure that continues to rise. This backlog is attributed to several factors: a significant number of judicial vacancies (often exceeding 30% in some High Courts), insufficient infrastructure, complex procedural laws, and a growing litigation rate. To address this, Article 224A of the Indian Constitution provides a mechanism for the Chief Justice of a High Court to request a retired High Court judge to sit and act as a judge of that High Court, with the prior consent of the President. This provision is specifically designed to tackle the backlog by temporarily augmenting judicial strength. However, as the CJI noted, this provision has been underutilized because retired judges, who typically retire at 62 (compared to 65 for Supreme Court judges), perceive sitting as 'junior' ad hoc judges as a demotion or an embarrassment, hindering their willingness to serve.

In response to this dilemma, the Supreme Court has now granted greater discretion to High Court Chief Justices regarding the composition of benches. This move aims to empower HCs to utilize experienced judicial talent more effectively without necessarily relegating retired judges to a 'junior' status. It suggests a more flexible approach to integrating ad hoc judges, potentially allowing them to preside over benches or specific categories of cases where their expertise is most needed.

**Key Stakeholders Involved:**

1. **Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the Supreme Court:** As the head of the Indian judiciary, the CJI initiates crucial reforms and provides guidance. The Supreme Court, as the highest judicial body, plays a supervisory and interpretative role, setting precedents and issuing directives to streamline justice delivery.

2. **High Court Chief Justices:** They are directly responsible for managing the affairs of their respective High Courts, including bench composition and addressing pendency. The increased discretion granted to them is pivotal for the practical implementation of any strategy involving ad hoc judges.

3. **Retired High Court Judges:** This cohort represents a vast pool of experienced legal minds. Their willingness to serve is crucial, and their concerns about status and perceived hierarchy need to be addressed for the success of any ad hoc judge scheme.

4. **The Union Government (Executive):** While judicial appointments are primarily handled by the Collegium, the government plays a role in approving appointments, providing infrastructure, and funding the judiciary. Any policy affecting judicial strength or terms of service requires executive cooperation.

5. **Litigants and the Public:** Ultimately, the common citizen awaiting justice is the primary beneficiary or victim of the judicial system's efficiency. Delays impact their fundamental right to a speedy trial, enshrined implicitly under Article 21.

**Why This Matters for India:**

The issue of judicial pendency has profound implications for India. Economically, prolonged litigation deters domestic and foreign investment, ties up capital, and increases the cost of doing business. Politically, a slow justice system can erode public faith in democratic institutions and the rule of law. Socially, it leads to injustice, disproportionately affecting the poor and marginalized who cannot afford long legal battles. The efficient functioning of the judiciary is a bedrock of good governance and directly impacts India's global standing and its ability to attract investment and foster development. The effective utilization of retired judges could significantly reduce the backlog, thereby strengthening the rule of law and enhancing access to justice for millions.

**Historical Context and Constitutional Provisions:**

The provision for appointing ad hoc judges (Article 224A) has existed since the Constitution's inception, reflecting the foresight of the framers in anticipating potential backlogs. However, its sporadic use highlights the systemic challenges. Various Law Commission Reports, such as the 120th Report (1987) and the 245th Report (2014), have consistently emphasized the need to increase judicial strength and utilize retired judges. Article 217 outlines the appointment and conditions of service for High Court judges, including the retirement age of 62. The distinction in retirement age between HC (62) and SC (65) judges creates a unique window for utilizing experienced HC judges. The broader constitutional framework for the judiciary, including Articles 124 (Supreme Court) and 214 (High Courts), underscores the importance of an independent and efficient judicial system.

**Future Implications:**

The Supreme Court's decision to grant discretion to High Court Chief Justices is a step towards practical reform. If implemented effectively, it could lead to a more dignified and productive role for retired judges, leveraging their vast experience. This might encourage more retired judges to accept such appointments, thereby providing a much-needed boost to judicial strength. However, this is a stop-gap measure. Long-term solutions still require addressing fundamental issues like increasing the sanctioned strength of judges, streamlining the appointment process (Collegium system), improving judicial infrastructure, adopting modern case management techniques, and promoting alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. The success of this initiative will depend on how High Court Chief Justices exercise their discretion and whether the 'embarrassment' factor can be genuinely mitigated through respectful integration and appropriate remuneration. It might also spark a renewed debate on increasing the retirement age of High Court judges to 65, aligning it with that of Supreme Court judges, to retain experienced talent within the regular system for longer periods.