India faces its ‘greatest strategic challenge’ in Bangladesh since 1971: Parliamentary committee on external affairs

The recent warning by a Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs, stating that India faces its 'greatest strategic challenge' in Bangladesh since 1971, underscores a critical juncture in India's foreign policy and regional dynamics. This assessment highlights the risk of New Delhi losing 'strategic space' in Dhaka without a necessary policy recalibration, pointing towards a complex interplay of historical ties, evolving geopolitical realities, and the growing influence of other global powers.

The background context of India-Bangladesh relations is deeply rooted in the 1971 Liberation War, where India played a pivotal role in Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. This shared history fostered a bond often described as 'special,' characterized by cultural proximity, economic ties, and security cooperation. However, over the decades, this relationship has seen its share of fluctuations. While periods of strong bilateral cooperation, particularly under the Awami League government in Bangladesh, have been common, underlying issues and the rise of alternative partnerships for Bangladesh have begun to test India's traditional influence.

The 'greatest strategic challenge' since 1971 implies a situation where India's geopolitical leverage, economic influence, and security interests in Bangladesh are perceived to be under significant threat. 'Strategic space' refers to India's ability to shape outcomes, maintain security cooperation, foster economic interdependence, and ensure diplomatic alignment with Bangladesh. The committee's warning suggests that this space is shrinking, potentially due to Bangladesh's increasing engagement with other countries, primarily China.

Key stakeholders in this evolving dynamic include the **Government of India**, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, which formulates and executes foreign policy, and the **Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs**, which provides oversight and recommendations. On the Bangladeshi side, the **Government of Bangladesh**, currently led by the Awami League, and its foreign policy establishment are crucial. Beyond these two nations, **China** emerges as a significant third-party stakeholder. China's proactive 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) and increasing defence and economic engagements with Bangladesh have become a major point of concern for India, as they directly challenge India's traditional influence. Other global powers like the **USA** also engage with Bangladesh as part of their broader Indo-Pacific strategies, adding layers of complexity.

This situation matters immensely for India for several reasons. Geopolitically, Bangladesh's strategic location, bordering India's vulnerable 'Chicken's Neck' corridor to the Northeast, makes it vital for India's security and connectivity. Any erosion of India's influence could have significant security implications, affecting border management, counter-insurgency efforts in the Northeast, and efforts to combat illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Economically, Bangladesh is a crucial trading partner and a gateway for India's 'Act East Policy,' facilitating connectivity projects like the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement and access to Chittagong and Mongla ports. Losing strategic space could impact these vital economic and connectivity initiatives, hindering regional integration and India's economic aspirations in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it impacts India's standing as a regional power and its 'Neighbourhood First Policy.'

Historically, the 1971 war established a strong foundation, but subsequent political changes in Bangladesh, including periods of military rule and shifts in political ideology, occasionally strained relations. Issues like water sharing (e.g., Teesta River dispute), border killings, and perception management have been persistent challenges. The **Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) of 2015**, enacted through the **100th Constitutional Amendment Act**, was a landmark achievement that resolved long-standing border issues and demonstrated strong political will from both sides. This agreement significantly improved trust and cooperation. However, the current warning suggests that even such successes might not be enough to counter the growing influence of rival powers.

Future implications of this challenge necessitate a serious 'recalibration' of India's policy towards Bangladesh. This could involve enhanced economic diplomacy, focusing on projects that offer tangible benefits to Bangladesh, such as infrastructure development, energy cooperation, and skill development. Deeper cultural exchanges, addressing unresolved issues like the Teesta water-sharing agreement, and ensuring robust security cooperation are also critical. India might need to offer more competitive alternatives to Chinese investments and loans, focusing on transparency and long-term benefits. Failure to recalibrate could lead to a significant shift in Bangladesh's foreign policy orientation, potentially impacting India's regional security architecture and its aspirations for leadership in the Bay of Bengal region. From a constitutional perspective, while there isn't a specific article governing foreign policy towards a particular nation, **Article 51** of the Directive Principles of State Policy, which promotes international peace and security and maintenance of just and honourable relations between nations, broadly guides India's approach to its neighbours.

Ultimately, the committee's warning serves as a crucial reminder for India to proactively safeguard its interests and reinforce its enduring partnership with Bangladesh amidst an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape. The challenge is not merely about retaining influence but about ensuring regional stability, economic prosperity, and shared security in India's immediate neighbourhood.